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I Spy Something Read! Employer Monitoring of Personal
Employee Webmail Accounts
Kevin W. Chapman'
An employee arrives at work, logs onto Hotmail, types a
quick message to his wife, sends a quick e-mail to friends about
catching tonight's game at the bar, and forwards the latest joke that
is a little risque. This type of e-mail use is common in corporate
America among employers of all sizes. However, use of personal
e-mail at work is no minor distraction. Consider an average size
company of 1,000 employees-if the employees spend only one
hour of each day on the Internet or using e-mail, the cost to the
company could be greater than $35 million dollars in lost
productivity in one year.2 Major companies such as Xerox, the
New York Times, Chevron, and Microsoft have been forced either
to fire employees or settle lawsuits relating to e-mail use at work.3
Recently, employees have shifted to using personal, web-based emails at work. 4 Recognizing these problems, employers are now
using surveillance software, known as "spyware," that can "capture
every keystroke a user types at a computer, or take screen shots at
regular interval[s] of everything a computer user
does. [This]
5
activity.",
e-mail
Web-based
logging
include[s]
E-mail use is commonplace in work environments. Some
use is for legitimate business purposes, but much is for personal
purposes: corresponding with family and friends, forwarding the
latest jokes, or planning social events. E-mail is a valuable
resource for employers. At the same time, however, it poses many
1J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2005.
2

Dan Verton, Employers OK with e-surfing, at http://www.computerworld.com

/managementtopics/ebusiness/story/0,10801,55344,00.html (Dec. 18, 2000) (on

file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).

3 Michelle Conlin, Workers, Surfat Your Own Risk, Bus. WK., June 12, 2000, at

105.

4 Bob Sullivan, Who 's spying on my Hotmail?, at http://www.msnbc.com

/news/800409.asp (Aug. 28, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
5
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risks and problems. Many companies are choosing to monitor
their employees' use of electronic resources such as e-mail, the
Internet, and instant messaging.7 Companies also are
implementing policies outlining to employees what kinds of
information can and cannot be accessed from work.8 These "rules,
policies and monitoring tools are designed to protect. . .
9
companies [human and financial] assets, future and reputation.
However, the existence of employer monitoring has resulted in
some friction between employers and employees, as evidenced by
recent litigation.
This Recent Development focuses on a specific type of
surveillance: private employers' monitoring of their employees'
personal webmail accounts, such as Yahoo or Hotmail. First, this
Recent Development reviews two recent district court decisions
that involve employee use of web-based e-mail accounts at work.
The Recent Development then argues that given the unsettled state
of the law of employer e-mail surveillance of webmail, the courts
should expand the laws allowing employer monitoring to explicitly
include personal employee webmail accounts accessed by
employees on company computer networks or Internet
connections. Finally, this Recent Development suggests ways
6

William C. Gleisner, 1II, Michael J. Kuborn & Michael McCrystal, Coping

With the Legal Perils of Employee Email, 72 WiS. LAW. 10, 11 (1999)
(suggesting that several potential problems e-mail can create include: company
liability for harassing e-mails sent by an employee, distribution of pornography
via e-mail, libelous e-mails, release of confidential information and loss of trade
secrets from e-mail use).
7A recent study "found that 14 million employees in the United States... have
their Internet or e-mail use at work under continuous surveillance." Worldwide,
that number is estimated to be around 27 million. Monte Enbysk, Shouldyou
monitoryour employees' Web use?, at Microsoft bCentral,
http://www.bcentral.com/articles/enbysk/156.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
8 AMERICAN MGMT. Ass'N, 2001 AMA STUDY, WORKPLACE MONITORING
&
SURVEILLANCE: POLICIES AND PRACTICES, 2001, at
http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/emsfu-short.pdf [hereinafter 2001 AMA
STUDY] (last visited Oct. 26, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
9Helen Jung, Watching what you write, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Sept. 7, 2003, at 14E (quoting Nancy Flynn, executive director of the ePolicy
Institute).
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employers can ensure that e-mail monitoring policies will
withstand employee challenges.
I.

Reasons for Monitoring

Employers give three main reasons for electronically
monitoring employee e-mail use: minimizing liability, avoiding
reduction in employee productivity, and protecting company
assets.' 0 Employers consider legal liability the foremost reason to
monitor employee e-mail. Employee use of e-mail at work can
result in sexual or racial harassment, fraud, libel or securities fraud
claims." I Furthermore, most viruses are spread through use of email. An employee can unknowingly spread virus-infected e-mails
to others, exposing the company to tremendous liability. The cost
of downtime alone, while networks are repaired, can be a
tremendous expense to employers.
Second, employers are concerned that personal Internet and
e-mail use decreases employee productivity.1 2 A recent American
Management Association study reported that nearly half of all
employers surveyed explained that a very important reason for
monitoring e-mail and Internet use in the workplace is to measure
employee productivity.' 3 Studies show that employee use of
Internet and e-mail while at work is staggering-one recent study
claims that "70% of employees admit to viewing or sending adultoriented personal e-mail while at work.'"' 4 A more recent article
quotes even more astounding statistics regarding Internet and email use at the workplace: more than eighty-five percent of
employees use e-mail at work for personal activities, and during
the 2000 Christmas season, forty-six percent of online shopping
'0Russell J. McEwan & David Fish, Privacy in the Workplace, N.J. L. MAG.,
Feb. 2002, at 20.
" Micah Echols, Striking a Balance Between Employer Business Interests and
Employee Privacy: Using Respondeat Superior to Justify the Monitoringof
Web-Based, PersonalElectronic Mail Accounts of Employees in the Workplace,
7 COMP. L. REv. & TECH. J. 273, 278 (2003).
12 2001 AMA Study, supra
note 8.
13Id

Conlin, supra note 3, at 106 (quoting a study by NFO Worldwide, American
Management Association, Vault.com).
14
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was done while at work.' 5 Even if these statistics are inflated it
becomes obvious that time spent on personal e-mail and Internet
use can quickly add up, distracting an employee's attention
from
16
work. This leads to decreased worker productivity.
Finally, companies monitor e-mail usage to protect their
assets. 17 Theft, unapproved sharing of trade secrets,
embezzlement, and destruction or damage to computer resources
via a virus are major concerns when employees use web-based email programs. 8 Employers may be particularly concerned about
the loss of confidential information or client lists in certain work
environments. Monitoring, therefore, serves as a deterrent to
employees who may share this information with outside sources.
II.

Employee Causes of Action

Employees seeking legal recourse against employers for
monitoring personal e-mail accounts accessed at work usually will
seek one of two avenues. Federal statutes relating to the
interception and storing of information may be applicable.
Additionally, employees may seek legal action against their
employers based on the theory of common law invasion of privacy.
Both of these causes of action are important because they are
applicable in situations involving the monitoring of personal, webbased e-mail.
A. Federal Statutes
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA"),19
which amended the Wiretap Act,20 "prohibits the intentional
15 McEwan,

supra note 10, at 21.
Conlin, supra note 3 (noting that "cyber-loafing accounts for 30% to 40% of
lost worker productivity, according to ... International Data Corp.").
17 McEwan, supra note 10, at 20-21.
18 A recent virus is believed to have cost over $100 million dollars in damages
due to computer hardware and software damages as well as lost business and
productivity. Id.
'9 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000).
20 Id. §§ 2510-22. "[The] ECPA amended the Federal Wiretap Act by extending
to data and electronic transmissions the same protection already afforded to oral
16
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interception of wire, oral or electronic communications and the
intentional disclosure of the contents.., by one knowing or having
reason to know that the information was obtained through an
interception that violates the act." 21 To violate the ECPA, the
acquisition of communication must occur during the transmission,
not after the e-mail is received. 22 Accessing stored, opened e-mail
after receipt is not considered "intercepting" under the ECPA. 23
The Wiretap Act does have two relevant exceptions. The
first exception applies when one party to the transaction consents
to being monitored.24 This is why many employers require their
employees to consent to monitoring. If a company has a consent
form, in writing, signed by the employee, the likelihood of that
employee successfully bringing suit under the ECPA is
significantly reduced. Some courts have even found implied
consent where employees were notified of a company e-mail

and wire communications." This Act now provides a private right of action
"against one who intentionally intercepts, [or] endeavors to intercept ...any
wire, oral, or electrcnic communication." Prior to the ECPA, the Wiretap Act
only applied this protection to oral and wire communications. Blumofe v.
Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re Pharmatrak Inc.), 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003).
21 Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d
914, 922 (W.D.
Wis. 2002).
22 Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-RWZ,
2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *8 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 634 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
23 Fraser,135 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (noting that accessing an e-mail
post receipt is
not intercepting it and thus does not violate the ECPA and comparing this post
receipt viewing to finding an already opened letter sent via the U.S. Postal
Service on a co-worker's desk and reading it,
which would not amount to
interception); see also Garrity,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *8 (Electronic
Communications Privacy Act "requires that the acquisition of electronic
communications occur during transmission."); Steve Jackson Games Inc. v.
United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994).
24 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) ("It shall not be unlawful under this chapter...
for a
person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic
communication where such person is a party to the communication or one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception"); see
also Pharmatrak,329 F.3d at 19.
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policy in an employee handbook, but still choose to use e-mail for
25
personal use.
The second exception to the ECPA is the "provider
exception." Providers of e-mail service are exempt from the
26
ECPA's prohibitions on access and its prohibitions on disclosure.
This exception is another justification for employers to monitor
their own proprietary e-mail account system without being in
violation of the ECPA.27
Therefore, employers will not violate the ECPA as long as
they fit into one of three categories. First, employers are
monitoring only post-receipt e-mails. This negates the interception
requirement of the ECPA. Second, employers are providing the
electronic service. This is an exception to the ECPA. Third, a
consent policy is in place, another exception to the ECPA. A plain
reading of the statute suggests that as few as one of these criteria
would suffice, though employers should consider more.
Whereas the ECPA deals with interception of electronic
28
communications, the Stored Communications Act ("SCA")
prevents "intentional access without authorization [of] a facility
25

Corey A. Ciocchetti, MonitoringEmployee E-Mail: Efficient Workplaces vs.

Employee Privacy, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 26, 25 (2001); Eric P.
Robinson, Big Brother or Modern Management: E-Mail Monitoring in the
Private Workplace, 17 LAB. LAW. 311, 316-17 (2001).
26 The ECPA provider exception is stated
as follows:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter [ 18 U.S.C.S.
§§ 2510-22] for a... provider of wire or electronic
communication service, whose facilities are used in the
transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to
intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal
course of his employment while engaged in any activity which
is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
service ....
18 U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(a)(i).
27 Larry 0. Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity:
ElectronicMail Monitoring
in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345, 359 (1995);
Michele C. Kane, ELECTRONIC EMAIL AND PRIVACY, PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE PATENTS COPYRIGHTS TRADEMARKS LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, Oct.- Nov. 1993, at 419, 438.
28 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2003).
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through which an electronic communication service is provided."'2 9
Thus, the SCA's focus is post-transmission. It generally prohibits
unauthorized access to the contents of communications while in
electronic storage.30 Another action that would violate the SCA is
the situation where someone, in this case an employer, exceeds
authorization to access such stored contents. 3 1 In order for this to
be a violation of the SCA, the employer must, in addition to

overstepping its authorization, obtain, alter, or prevent the
employee's authorized access to his own e-mail account.32 Similar

to the ECPA, persons or entities providing the electronic
communications service are exempt under the SCA.33 For this
reason, the act usually is inapplicable in situations where an
employer monitors employee use of a company, proprietary e-mail
system. 34 However, the cases fail to explain how the SCA might
apply to employer access to stored, personal webmail accessed
from work computers via the company's Internet connection.3 5
B. Common Law Claim
Some states recognize a common law invasion of privacy

37
claim, 36 sometimes referred to as "intrusion upon seclusion."

29 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1).
30 Id.
§ 2701(a).
31

Id. § 2701(a)(2).

32

See id.§ 2701; see also Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F.

Supp. 2d 914, 926 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (requiring, in addition to intentionally
accessing the plaintiff's Hotmail account, that the plaintiff also must show that
defendants "obtained, altered or prevented his authorized access to his email
account" such as by changing one's password or preventing one access to one's
messages.).
"
18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1).
34
Id.; Echols, supra note 11, at 275-76.
35See Fischer,207 F. Supp. 2d at 924-26. The Fischer court denied the
employer's motion for summary judgment. The court does not directly state
whether monitoring of web-based, personal e-mails, which are accessed at work
and thus would be stored in some form on the employer's machine, would be a
violation of the SCA. Id.
36 See,e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Muick
v. Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2002); McLaren v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, *8 (Tex. App. May 28,
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Other states have codified this tort. 38 To prove this claim,
plaintiffs must overcome two hurdles: first, the employees must
show that a reasonable expectation of privacy exist and second,
that the invasion of privacy was highly offensive to a reasonable
person. 39 The expectation of privacy is measured not by reference
to the specific employee challenging the invasion, but instead by
whether the employee's expectation of privacy was reasonable.4 °
This hurdle is a high one and many employees will fail to satisfy
this first condition. Several court decisions have yet to get past
this first requirement, holding that no reasonable expectation of
privacy existed in situations where an employer was monitoring its
employees' use of company proprietary e-mail accounts. 4'
Further, even if such an expectation does exist, the court
also must find that a reasonable person would consider the
employee monitoring to be a substantial and highly offensive
invasion of privacy.42 The courts must determine what would be
"highly" offensive to a reasonable person. They often rely on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts which states that "one who
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or
1999); see aslo, Jarod J.White, E-mail @ Work.com: Employer Monitoringof
Employee E-Mail, 48 ALA. L. REv. 1070, 1096-97 (1997).
37 Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100.
38 See, e.g., Fischer,207 F. Supp. 2d at 927 (section 895.50(2)(a) of the
Wisconsin Statutes defines invasion of privacy); Restuccia v. Burk Tech., Inc.,
No. 95-2125, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 367, *9 (Super. Ct. Mass. Aug. 12,
1996) (providing that Massachusetts law gives a person a right against
unreasonable interference with his privacy).
39 Though not necessarily listing them in such an explicit manner, the court asks
whether the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and in
doing so asks if the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Smyth,
914 F. Supp. at 100-01; Ciocchetti, supra note 25.
40 Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *3 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002).
41 See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100-01; McLaren, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103,
at *13; Garrity, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *5-6. But see Restuccia, 1996
Mass. Super. LEXIS 367, at *9 (holding that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to "whether plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
email messages" and whether the reading thereof was an unreasonable
interference with plaintiffs privacy).
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977); see, e.g., Smyth, 914
F. Supp. at 100; Fischer, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
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seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." 43 In doing so,
courts have noted that in instances of employer monitoring of
company e-mail accounts, even if a reasonable expectation of
privacy existed, a reasonable person would not find the viewing of
the e-mail communications to be highly offensive.44 Thus far,
employees have not had much success in convincing the courts that
e-mail monitoring meets the standard of "highly offensive to a
reasonable person."
C. Other Causes of Action
While Fourth Amendment safeguards against unreasonable
search and seizure exist, they require state action.45 The Fourth
Amendment does not apply to action by non-governmental actors,
like private employers. As this Recent Development focuses
exclusively on the acts of private employers, Fourth Amendment
claims are inapplicable.

§ 652B; see, e.g., Dubbs v. Head Start
Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1220 (10th Cir. 2003); Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v.
ABC, 306 F.3d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2002); Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100-01.
44See McLaren, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at * 13 (noting that the invasions
would not have been seen as "highly offensive" and that the company's interests
in preventing inappropriate comments and activity via e-mail would outweigh
any property interest in the e-mails); Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100-01 (noting that
the invasions would not be such because the employer is not requiring the
employee to disclose personal information or invading personal effects such as a
urinalysis or personal search would do; also noting the outweighing company
interest in preventing unprofessional comments via e-mail compared with the
employee's privacy interest).
45 White, supra note 36, at 1091-92 (citing Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987)); Ciocchetti, supranote 25, 9
(citing S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/PrivateDistinction:
Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 828 (1998)).
46 Since most Americans are employed in the private sector, the Fourth
Amendment right of privacy will be of little assistance in these e-mail
monitoring situations. White, supra note 36, at 1092; Ciocchetti, supra note 25,
9; see also Gleisner, supra note 6, at 12.
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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Company, Proprietary and Web-based, Personal E-mail

There is a fundamental difference between companycontrolled, company-provided e-mail accounts and personal, webbased accounts; each system has a different host or originator. In a
company system, the employer controls and usually hosts the
system on a company server. In a personal e-mail system, an
independent provider, such as Yahoo or Hotmail, stores the e-mail
on its server. Users can access their webmail accounts from any
computer connected to the Internet via the host's webmail page,
which allows for remote access.4 7 While the judicial and statutory

framework applicable for monitoring each type of e-mail is the
same, it is easy to predict how the courts will treat proprietary
e-mail system monitoring, given recent litigation. Courts normally
have sided with employers in this type of monitoring situation. It
is not as easy to predict, however, how the courts will treat
webmail monitoring, which is where the current monitoring
conflicts subsist and where the greatest legal risks exist for
employers.
A. Company-hosted, Proprietary E-mail
Company-hosted or proprietary e-mail accounts are
directed through a company server and installed on a company
computer network. 48 E-mails sent from these accounts are stored
on the company server even if employees compose or read
messages on their individual machines.49 Courts examining
common law privacy claims related to this type of e-mail
monitoring have generally sided with employers, holding that there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a company-maintained,
See Echols, supra note 11, at 277 (describing the process by which an
employee accesses his e-mail from work and the technological details that result
from that access, such as a history of websites visited); see, e.g., Learn more
47

about Yahoo! Mail, at http://edit.yahoo.com/config/form?.form=

ymsignupmoreinfo (last accessed Nov. 7, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
48 Echols, supra note 11, at 276.
49 Id. at 276-77.
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proprietary e-mail account. 50 These decisions are based on three
primary rationales.
First, the courts have focused on the fact that e-mails are
51
sent and received via the company, proprietary e-mail system.
Employees are using the company's property while on company
time. Using a computer and server that belong to another tends to
decrease one's expectation of privacy in the use of such devices.
For example, one who used a friend's computer to send e-mails
would not expect the same level of privacy as if he used his own
computer to send the same e-mails. The courts have used this
logic in employer monitoring situations, both when companies had
written e-mail monitoring policies notifying employees of such a
practice,52 and in the absence of such policies with assurances that
communications would not be subject to monitoring.53 Lack of
express consent is not sufficient to establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Thus, the courts have considered the
employer's interest to be of a greater weight than employee
privacy concerns. 54

Second, courts point to the fact that e-mails sent via
company e-mail systems are open to forwarding by a third party
which diminishes any expectation of privacy with regard to
"Courts have generally held that employees should expect little or no privacy
in e-mail sent or received through an employer's e-mail system and have thus
generally rejected invasion of privacy claims." Robinson, supra note 25, at 326;
see, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 100-01 (E.D. Pa. 1996);
McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS
4103, *13 (Tex. App. 1999); Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins. Co., No.
00-12143-RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *4-6. But see Restuccia v.
Burk Tech., No. 95-2125, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 367, at *9 (Super. Ct.
Mass. 1996).
50

51See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101.

Garrity,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *4-5 (noting that the company had a
detailed policy about the possibility of review of e-mail messages and use,
which were considered company property, and reminded employees of this
policy on several occasions).
52

53 Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98, 101 (asking that the company had repeatedly told

employees that e-mails would remain confidential, privileged and could not be
intercepted and used for purposes of termination or reprimand, yet court said no
expectation
of privacy existed).
54
id.
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e-mails.55 Even in cases where companies allowed employees to
create folders for their e-mail or utilize password protection for
their accounts, the courts still hold56that this does not create a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
Finally, the courts turn to the second prong of the invasion
of privacy test: the level of offensiveness that the intrusion would
impose on a reasonable person. The courts have suggested several
reasons why employee suits would not pass this hurdle. Courts
take into account an employer's justifications and interests in
monitoring, and have often determined that the legitimate business
interests of a company achieved by monitoring far outweigh an
employee's privacy concerns. Such legitimate business interests
include avoiding workplace discrimination 57 or investigating theft
or illegal activity. 58 The courts also stress the fact that all
computers used to store, send, and receive the e-mails are owned
by the employer, and are thus company property. 59 These factors
have led courts to conclude that an employer monitoring employee
e-mail messages on a proprietary company system, for legitimate
purposes, does not 6rise to the level of being highly offensive to a
reasonable person. 0

In Garrity,the court addressed the issue of whether a reasonable expectation
of privacy existed by examining the plaintiffs statements, one of which was that
"[they] assumed that the recipients of their messages might forward them to
others.... [Plaintiff] testified that the e-mails he sent to his wife would
eventually be sent to third parties." The court considered the ability to forward
e-mail as evidence of a lowered expectation of privacy. Garrity,2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8343, at *4.
56 Id. at *5 (holding that courts have flatly rejected such arguments as creating
a
reasonable expectation of privacy so that monitoring would become an invasion
of privacy); McLaren, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at *12.
"7Garrity,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *6 (noting that employer's business
interests in protecting others from harassment would "likely trump ... privacy
interests" and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires companies to
investigate conduct when it is discovered).
58 McLaren, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at *13 (these reasons outweigh the
claimed privacy interest in the communication); Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101.
59 Echols, supra note 11, at 285-86.
60 Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101; McLaren, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at *13.
55
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B. Web-based Personal E-mail Accounts
As employers increase monitoring of employee company email accounts, employees inevitably feel more secure using their
personal web-based e-mail accounts, such as Yahoo, Hotmail, and
Earthlink, for personal use while at work. 61 Unlike company email accounts, web-based e-mail accounts do not automatically
store all messages sent and received on the company server. They
are, instead, stored on the Internet company's server that provides
or hosts the account. 62 However, if employees wish to access these
personal accounts at work, they must use their employers'
computers and Internet connections to do so. 63 New technology
now allows employers to monitor these web-based accounts.
This technology allows them to monitor e-mail messages, record
keystrokes, and even take screenshots of what appears on an
employee's computer screen.65 However, because the case history
and statutory interpretations of this type of monitoring are
relatively new and undeveloped, employers face less certain legal
66
outcomes.
1. Caselaw on Monitoring Web-based Personal
E-mail
Two primary cases have dealt with employee suits
regarding employer monitoring or intrusion upon personal, web-

61 See

Sullivan, supra note 4 (explaining that office workers now commonly set
up free web-based e-mail accounts through such providers to "separate their
work and private affairs").
62 Echols, supra note 11, at 277.
63

id.

Sullivan, supra note 4 (The new eBlaster "spyware" "will secretly forward all
e-mail coming and going through [such] Web-based accounts to a spy's e-mail,
allowing anyone to 'ride along' even the supposedly private email.").
64

65 Enbysk, supra note 7.

66 Echols, supranote 11, at 290 (Employers monitoring personal webmail
accounts "do not have such a strong legal position as they do when monitoring
only company, proprietary e-mail accounts.").
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based e-mail accounts accessed from work: Fischerv. Mt. Olive
6
Lutheran Church,67 and Booker v. GTE.net.68
i. Fischerv. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church
In Fischerv. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, co-workers
overheard Fischer, a children's pastor, discussing acts of a
homosexual nature on the church phone. After sending Fischer
home, the senior pastor, in response to a police recommendation,
hired a technology expert to examine the church's computer. 69
Fischer had his own personal, web-based Hotmail account, which
he accessed from the church's computer via the church Internet
connection. 70 The Hotmail account was password protected;
however, with a suggestion from the senior pastor, the expert was
able to guess the password and gain entry to the account through
the Hotmail internet site. 71 That day, and on at least two
subsequent occasions, the expert and senior pastor viewed and
printed the messages found in Fischer's personal Hotmail
account. 72 Fischer had not used the church's computer to read all
of these messages that existed in his account at the time the senior
pastor viewed them. In defense of the church officials' actions, the
church claimed the officials needed to ensure that Fischer had not
made improper communications with minors whom he pastored.
The elders and church members subsequently voted to remove
Fischer from his position for which he sued, claiming a violation
of
73
account.
Hotmail
his
of
accessing
the
to
relating
privacy
his
The court examined the accessing of Fischer's e-mail
account under the Electronic Communication Storage Act
("ECSA"),74 also known as the Stored Communications Act
67

207 F. Supp. 2d 914 (W.D. Wis. 2002).

68 214 F. Supp. 2d 746 (E.D. Ky. 2002).
69 See
70

Fischer, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
Id. at 917, 920.
71
Id. at 920.
72
Id. at 920-21.
13 Id. at 920, 927. Fisher also sued for monitoring of his phone conversation that
day by his co-workers; however, for purposes of this discussion it is only
necessary to focus on the e-mail monitoring issue. Id.
14See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).
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("SCA"). Congress added this act to the Wiretap Act75 in 1986.76
The Wiretap Act (also referred to as the ECPA) protects e-mail
messages from interception while being transmitted,77 whereas the
SCA "indicates that an e-mail message is protected while stored at
'a facility through which electronic communication service is
78
provided."'
Prior decisions have held that an employer may access
stored proprietary e-mail and not be in violation of the SCA, so
long as that e-mail was stored on the employer's server.79 This is
the provider exception. In Fischer,however, the senior pastor and
expert "accessed plaintiff's e-mail while it was stored on a remote,
web-based server that is owned by Microsoft, an electronic
communication service provider." 80 The court never directly
addressed whether the actions in Fischer constitute a violation of
the SCA. Instead, noting an unresolved additional requirement
necessary to amount to a violation, the court denied the
employer's motion for summary judgment and left this to the
factfinder.
To fully understand the impact and limitations of
monitoring declared in Fischer,it is important to understand the
holding of Fraserv. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 82 Fraser is
a critical case because it interprets the ECPA and SCA as they
relate to the monitoring of e-mail accounts. In Fraser,a
company's e-mail history was examined by the employer and
incriminating evidence, gleaned from employee e-mails, was used
75

1d. § 2511.
Fischer,207 F. Supp. 2d at 924.
77Id. (citing United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976)).
78 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)) (emphasis added); see also United States v.
Moriarity, 962 F. Supp. 217, 221 (D. Mass. 1997).
79 See Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 637
(E.D. Pa.
2001) (providing that no violation of SCA occurred where an employer accessed
an employee's e-mail located on the employer's server after the recipient
downloaded it to his hard drive).
80 Fischer,207 F. Supp. 2d at 925.
81 Id. at 926 ("Accessing plaintiff's Hotmail account intentionally is not enough
in and of itself to violate the act. Plaintiff must also show that defendants
obtained, altered, or prevented his authorized access to his email account.").
82 Fraser,135 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
76
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to terminate the employee's agent agreement with employer. 83 The
Frasercase sets preliminary boundaries as to acceptable
monitoring behavior within the statutes' realms, which, when
coupled with Fischer,provide a partial road map for employers.
Within the preliminary boundaries, employers may monitor
company, proprietary e-mail. E-mail which is classified as "postreceipt" is not being intercepted and thus may be monitored.
Finally, if monitoring webmail, employers should avoid preventing
the employee access to his own personal account.
The Frasercourt declared that the ECPA could not be used
to hold employers liable for monitoring e-mails already in posttransmission storage because "retrieval of a message from storage
after transmission is complete is not 'interception' under the
Act.''84 Interception of e-mails prior to receipt, however, does
appear to constitute a violation of the ECPA. This would be true in
both web-based e-mail and company e-mail account monitoring.
Given the distinction the Frasercourt makes between emails in transit and those that are post-transmission, it is important
to differentiate between the two types in cases involving webbased e-mail monitoring such as Fischer. The first type of e-mail
is accessed from work and stored on the employer's computer or
server.85 In all likelihood this would equate to post-transmission
e-mails. The other type of e-mail, unretrieved e-mail, is that which
is not accessed via the employer's Internet connection, but is
housed on the Internet service provider's server and accessed
remotely by the employer from a location other than work.
83

d.at 631.

14

Id.at 635.

85

When employees send e-mails, "[t]he central computer routing the messages

stores the transmissions in unencrypted plain text files available to the service
provider, whether that be a third-party common carrier or the employer itself."
Gantt, supra note 27, at 349; see also Echols, supra note 11, at 276-77 ("Every
e-mail that is sent or received on the company proprietary e-mail account is
stored on the company server ....[T]he employer has unfettered access to the
stored e-mails ....
" Web-based personal e-mails are not stored on a company
server, "[b]ut a history of websites visited by the employee is stored on the
company server ....[Tihe e-mails sent and received from the web-based
account are stored on the server of the Internet company ....); Fraser, 135 F.
Supp. 2d at 633-34 (differentiating between intermediate stages, back-up
protection stages, and post-transmission stages of storing).
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Unfortunately, the courts have not explicitly stated whether
monitoring either of these types of e-mails would be a violation of
the SCA.
By failing to state what types of webmail monitoring
guided its decision to dismiss the summary judgment motion,
Fischer,unfortunately, does not provide much guidance on this
topic either. The court most likely failed to make this distinction
because of a disagreement between the parties over the existence
of certain e-mails. The court noted that "if defendants' version of
the facts is correct, [that the e-mails existed and defendant obtained
access to them] they would have obtained plaintiff's e-mail in
violation of the act." 86 In making this statement, however, the
court does not make it clear whether they are referring to those
e-mails read by plaintiff from work or those that were never
accessed.87 This is an important distinction because it would allow
for accuracy in predicting what types of monitoring of webmail
employers can engage in and feel confident about gaining
summary judgment.
Even though Fischer does not explicitly identify what types
of webmail monitoring will constitute violations of the ECPA and
SCA, the decision to deny the employer's motion for summary
judgment can, at a minimum, help set some boundaries for
webmail monitoring. The Fischercourt did suggest that had
defendants prevented the plaintiff's access to his e-mail account by
changing the password that might have constituted a violation of

86

Fischer,207 F. Supp. 2d at 926 (though not clear, it appears that the court is

stating that only the e-mails accessed by defendant which had not been viewed
at work and were obtained by way of the password violation would constitute a
violation of the act); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(2) (2000) (accessing the email account would have been a violation because defendant would have

"intentionally exceed[ed] an authorization to access that facility and thereby
obtain[ed or] alter[ed] ... a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage in such system .... ).

The likely assumption is that the court is referring to possible e-mails never
checked on the church's computer, because the employee does not appear to
challenge the existence of the supposed e-mail that was checked at work on the
day the events transpired.
87

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 5

the SCA. 88 This provides some statutory guidance in that the court

applies 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(2) of the SCA to a webmail
monitoring context. The court suggests that employers who access
an employee's webmail accounts without authority and then
proceed to block that employee's access to his own account will be
in violation of the SCA. Employers now know to avoid webmail
monitoring of this aspect.
Returning to Fraser,there is caselaw and statutory
authority establishing that the monitoring of a company's own email system will not amount to interception under the ECPA for
two reasons: first, an e-mail housed on the company system is not
"intercepted" by the employer;8 9 and, second, it falls under the
provider exception of the ECPA because the employer provides the
e-mail network system. This narrows the area of uncertainty in
the law of employee e-mail monitoring to two types of e-mail:
first, those personal, web-based e-mails accessed from work, and
presumably stored in some form on the employer's computer or
network, and, second, those never accessed from work and stored
on the remote sever of the webmail service provider. Situations
such as the one in Fischer,where unretrieved webmail messages,
never read at work, are able to be accessed by the employer, are
rare considering the difficulty that an employer would have
gaining access to an employee's complete webmail account. Short
of guessing the password or happening upon an open webmail
account on an employee's screen, an employer would face
difficulty in examining e-mails never read from the work
computer. This really leaves only one area of monitoring as
possible and also unaddressed by the courts. Therefore, the most
relevant issue is whether an employer should be able to monitor
web-based e-mails, accessed and read at work, or e-mails
88

Fischer,207 F. Supp. 2d at 926 (finding this would mean that defendant

prevented plaintiff's authorized access to his e-mail in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701(a)(2)).

89 See Fraser,135 F. Supp. 2d at 634-35; see also Garrity v. John Hancock Mut.

Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *7-8 (D.
Mass. May 7, 2002); Restuccia v. Burk Tech., 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 367, at
*6 (Super. Ct. Mass. Apr. 12, 1996).
90 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(a)(i).
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composed and sent from an employer-provided computer or
Internet connection.
In dicta, the Fischer court declined the chance to comment
on whether Frasercorrectly held that "the act [SCA] can be
violated only by accessing e-mail that has not yet been downloaded
to the recipient's hard drive." 91 It is uncertain if the acquiescence
of Fraser'sSCA holding means the court condones the accessing
of e-mail downloaded to a company computer. 92 If Fischerwas
implicitly approving Fraser,then Fraser'spost-transmission
argument could be extended to allow companies to view personal,
web-based e-mail exchanges that have been downloaded, stored,
and are accessible from the employer's company computers. An
employer who examines an employee's hard drive, searches the
history feature of Internet Explorer, or examines cookies saved by
the computer may be acting legitimately under the Fraserholding
because the monitoring would be "post-transmission."
In fact, there is strong support for the theory that the
Fischercourt was concerned not with the monitoring of stored
webmail, but with the actions the defendants took to access e-mails
employees did not read at work. First, perhaps the strongest
support is the fact that the court never mentions access to anything
on the employer's server, only access to the messages on the
remote Hotmail server, hosted by Microsoft. This suggests the
court has no reservations about the monitoring of the e-mail
accessed on the church computer. Both company provided e-mail
and web-based e-mails read at work would exist on the employer's
server or local computer. Second, the court may be concerned that
Fischer was able to make a conscious choice to subject the workaccessed webmails to possible monitoring. However, Fischer did
not make a deliberate choice to have the other unretrieved e-mail
open to being viewed by his employer. Finally, when Fischer
referred to the possibility of a violation having occurred, it focused
on two points: whether disputed messages existed, presumably not
91Fischer,207 F. Supp. 2d at 925.
92 Id. (stating that because the e-mail was stored by Microsoft and not on the
employer's server, "it is unnecessary to determine whether Fraserheld correctly
that the act could be violated only by accessing email that has not yet been
downloaded to the recipient's hard drive.").
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accessed at work, and whether defendants prevented Fischer access
to his webmail.
Therefore, the Fischercase does set some boundaries
describing what clearly is off limits, such as changing passwords,
and what is clearly within the SCA and ECPA, monitoring which
is approved under Fraser. In summary, while the court leaves
unresolved the issue of monitoring webmail, they apparently
approve of monitoring web-based, personal e-mail messages
accessed from work. At the same time the court appears concerned
about monitoring those messages which are housed on a thirdparty server, accessed from locations other than work, and never
retrieved on the employer's computer.
In addition to examining the monitoring of employee,
personal e-mail accounts under the SCA, the Fishercourt
also
93
analyzed the case under an invasion of privacy theory.
Wisconsin's invasion of privacy statute is similar to the
Restatement version. 94 The defendant in Fischerargued that a
person's e-mail account cannot be a "place" upon which someone
may intrude. To guide their decision, the court looked to the
Restatement's broader definition of intrusion upon seclusion,
which requires intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of someone
or his private concerns which would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person. 95 The court agreed that e-mail, like a medical
file,96 is not a place of a geographic nature.97 However, under the
Restatement definition, e-mail might qualify as personal
belongings or a person's private concerns. The court read the
Wisconsin statute broadly to coincide with the Restatement,
concluding that e-mail falls under the category of a person's
98
private belongings within the meaning of the statute.
Unfortunately, the court did not analyze whether this defendant's
93
94 Id. at

927.
Id. (Section 895.50(2)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes defines one of the types of
invasion of privacy as an "[i]ntrusion upon the privacy of another of a nature
highly offensive to a reasonable person, in a place that a reasonable person
would
consider private or in a manner which is actionable for trespass.").
95
Id. at 928 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976)).
96 Hillman v. Columbia County, 474 N.W.2d 913, 919 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991).
97 Fischer, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
98 Id.
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actions amounted to an invasion of privacy under the standard of
"highly offensive to a reasonable person." Instead, the court
for summary judgment, leaving this question to
denied the motion
99
the fact finder.

In summary, Fischer does not answer completely what is
"highly offensive to a reasonable person," and thus, an invasion of
privacy. Nor does the case outline what constitutes a violation of
the SCA regarding the monitoring of web-based, personal e-mail
accounts. However, this case is important because it is one of the
few that provides some insight into a court's analytical process for
deciding cases dealing with employer access to employee personal,
web-based accounts. At the very least, the case does provide
defined boundaries for what is acceptable employer monitoring.
ii. Booker v. GTE.net LLC
Booker v. GTE.net LLC is the second major case dealing
with web-based e-mail use at work and focuses on employee
utilization of personal, web-based e-mail which resulted in an
attempt to hold the employer liable.' 00 This case supports the
premise that the respondeat superior theory alone may be enough
to justify monitoring of personal, web-based e-mail accounts. 101
The situation in Booker may have been avoided through webmail
monitoring. In Booker, GTE.net employees created, at work, a
fake, personal, web-based e-mail account in Booker's name and
sent out a rude and vengeful e-mail to one of the company's
complaining customers. 102 Booker was not a GTE.net employee
and had no relation to the company. 0 3 Booker attempted to sue
the company under a theory of vicarious liability, or respondeat
superior. 104 In order to recover under this theory, one must show
that the tortfeasors' acts were performed in the "scope of

99 Id.
'00 214 F. Supp. 2d 746, 748 (E.D. Ky. 2002).

Echols, supra note 11, at 287-88.
'0'
102 Booker, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
103Id.
'04 Id. at 748-50.
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employment. ' 05 The court found 06
that the employees' actions were
outside the scope of employment.'

This case provides an important warning for employers:
unmonitored use of personal, web-based e-mail accounts by
employees at work could expose the employer to liability based on

the theory of respondeat superior. With a monitoring system such
as those currently available, the company may have been able to
catch the e-mail before it was sent out, or at least correct the action
in a more expedient manner. At the very least, the ability to
monitor such activities would decrease a company's liability

concerns. Thus, the Booker case lends credit to the liability
rationale companies use to justify monitoring of proprietary
company e-mail accounts. This holding also gives companies a
supplementary reason to expand monitoring to cover personal,

web-based accounts.
2. Issues Left Unaddressed by the Courts
The Booker and Fischercourts did not examine the
expectation of privacy that might attach to personal, web-based

e-mail accessed from work. Nonetheless, a series of cases dealing
with company e-mail accounts suggest arguments that may make
1 7
an impact on courts considering the issue. 0
When an employer provides access to the Internet at work,
it is presumably for work purposes. The Internet connection helps
"o5Id. at 749.
Under Kentucky law, courts examine four criteria to decide when actions

106

occur within the "scope of employment." Booker did not meet the third and
fourth factors: "the action was in furtherance of the employer's business," and
"the conduct though unauthorized, was expectable in view of the employee's
duties." The effect of Booker's e-mail was not in furtherance of the employer's
business as it actually encouraged the customer to switch phone companies. The
court also noted that the conduct was unexpected since falsely creating thirdparty e-mail accounts and sending offensive e-mails is unusual behavior for
customer service representatives. Id. at 749-50.
107 See, e.g., McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS
4103, at *12
(Tex. App. May 28, 1999); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D.
Pa. 1996); Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-RWZ,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *3-8 (D. Mass. 2002); Muick v. Glenayre
Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2002).
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the employee do his or her job. The expectation of privacy is
lower for company-provided work tools than it is for those
conveniences that a company provides to employees for their
personal use,' 08 such as providing storage space in a personal work
locker. 109 Using this logic, an employee using a computer, a
company-provided work tool, will have a lowered expectation of
privacy. It then follows that employees accessing personal
webmails via employer-provided computers and Internet access,
will also have a lower expectation of privacy. This hinges on the
assumption that the Internet access and company computer are
tools provided for work, and not employer-provided conveniences.
A personal locker presumably is not used for work
purposes, rather it is provided purely for an employee's personal
convenience. 10 However, company-hosted e-mail systems exist to
help employees perform their work-related duties."1 Internet
access at work is a tool employers provide to help their employees
perform their jobs in an efficient and expedient manner. Neither
company e-mail systems, nor Internet access, are provided for
employees' personal convenience, in the way a personal locker is.
A general way to differentiate between a perk and a job
performance tool would be to determine its primary purpose.
Another method would be to examine whether the tool can be
either directly or indirectly linked to producing revenue for the
employer, or whether it is solely a cost source.12 Many employees
108

See McLaren, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at *11-12 (drawing a distinction

between searching company provided lockers on which employees can place
personal locks and decrypting and reading e-mails stored in password protected
personal e-mail folders where employees stored personal e-mails generated by
the company's e-mail system. The court was unable to conclude that "creating a

personal password, manifested-and Microsoft recognized-a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the email messages such that Microsoft
was precluded from reviewing the messages.").
109
K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Tex. App.
1984).
110McLaren, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at *11 ("[T]he locker in Trotti was
provided to the employee for the specific purpose of storing personal
belongings, not work items.").
111 Id.
112 Business professionals call items that have no link to revenue production or
support "cost centers" or "cost sources." They do not directly or indirectly
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perform significant amounts of research related to their job from
their company Internet access. Thus, the employer-provided
Internet access can be tied to producing revenue. A work locker is
simply a convenience and no apparent relationship exists between
it and the company's revenue production. Therefore, because an
employer's Internet access is provided for workplace revenue
production, it would be analogous to a work tool and an employee
should anticipate a lower expectation of privacy in the use of such
tools. Because the personal webmail account grows out of the
company-provided work tool, the Internet connection, there is a
decreased expectation of privacy with respect to the use of these
accounts while at work.
Some commentators, however, make a distinction between
the two types of e-mail accounts: personal, web-based and
company, proprietary. David Sobel, general counsel of the
Electronic Privacy Information Center argues that
if a company.com account is provided to me for
company business, I can assume it might be subject
to monitoring ... but if I take additional step[s] to
set up a Hotmail account that I occasionally access
from my desktop at work, I think that could be
construed as an expression of an expectation of

privacy. 113
While this argument seems valid on the surface, in light of the
method of analysis the court has applied to proprietary e-mail
monitoring and the similarity between the two types of e-mail, a
impact revenue, but are rather expenses, in the classic accounting terminology,
which decrease the company's bottom line. They exist simply as a means of
convenience to the employee out of the employer's generosity. The personal
locker example is a classic cost center that produces no revenue, but simply
makes the employees' work life more comfortable. Another cost source would
be employer-provided snacks or drinks. They simply make work life more
enjoyable.
113 Sullivan, supra note 4. But see Kim Komando, Why you
need a company
policy on Internet use, Microsoft bCentral, at http://www.bcentral.com/articles
/komando/l 16.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2003) (noting that by making your
Internet policy clear, the employees know of the monitoring and have no
expectation of privacy) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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strong argument can be made that the use of personal webmail
accounts will not create an expectation of privacy. Many of the
same features that have caused the courts to say that there is no
expectation of privacy in company-owned e-mail accounts are also
present in personal, web-based e-mail accounts. 1 l4 Two such
features include the method and manner of monitoring and
employer ownership of the resources used to access the e-mail.
These similarities provide a strong basis for the argument that the
courts should examine expectation of privacy in webmail accounts
in the same manner they do for employer-provided e-mail
accounts, and reach the same conclusion-there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to these types of e-mail
accounts.
3. Analysis
Certain aspects of personal, web-based e-mail monitoring
have been addressed by the courts, but others have not. The courts
should view personal, web-based e-mail monitoring in the same
manner that they view company e-mail monitoring. Given the
limited caselaw on monitoring of personal, web-based e-mail, the
legality of such monitoring is unclear. However, caselaw suggests
that if done for legitimate business purposes, within the confines of
the ECPA and SCA, and with a well-designed policy in place,
companies will be able to monitor employees' webmail15at work.
Based on an understanding of current caselaw,
employers should be able to expand their monitoring to encompass
See Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343 at *6 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (attempting to avoid
harassment and discrimination in the workforce outweighs privacy interests of
employees); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996);
McLaren, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at * 13 (preventing inappropriate and
unprofessional comments, or even illegal activity are business purposes that
justify monitoring).
15 For discussion of the ECPA and the definition of "intercept," see Garrity
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343, at *7-8; Blumofe v. Pharmatrak, Inc. (In re
Pharmatrak Inc.), 329 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2003); Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran
Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 924 (W.D. Wis. 2002); Fraser v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 634-35 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
114
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all e-mails, including those from personal web-based accounts,
without violating the ECPA. Though most courts have not
addressed this specific form of e-mail monitoring, the approaches
companies use to avoid the ECPA's restrictions when monitoring
company, proprietary accounts will also apply to personal, webbased ones. These approaches include arguing that monitoring and
reviewing e-mail after receipt is not "interception," as well as
obtaining consent from employees to engage in this style of e-mail
supervision. Given the legal success of such strategies, companies
should follow the same strategies used for monitoring company email, when monitoring personal, web-based e-mail accounts.
Because the ECPA covers interception of electronic
communication,116 companies need only ensure that they are not
intercepting the messages, and instead are accessing them from
storage. Frasershows that the courts will not view this type of
activity as a violation of the ECPA. Employers can further protect
themselves from the ECPA's reach by obtaining consent from
employees to monitor these accounts. Other than the fact that
employers will not qualify under the provider exception to the
ECPA, companies should use the same proactive defense strategies
they have used when monitoring company, proprietary e-mail
accounts to avoid ECPA violations. Following these steps,
employers will avoid ECPA violations, and also fit within the
statutorily-defined exceptions.
The issue of SCA violations has not been answered by the
courts. Under Fraserlogic, a company would most likely be
justified in examining personal, web-based e-mail only after it has
been accessed by the employee while at work. This would allow a
copy of the e-mail to be stored on the company's computer which
the employer may then view. However, companies should limit
their monitoring to stored e-mails and avoid obtaining, altering, or
preventing unauthorized access to the e-mail account to avoid
violating the SCA.
The courts have given little indication of whether this new
personal, web-based monitoring scheme would be a common law
violation of an employee's privacy. Neither of the two prongs of
116

18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2000); see also Fraser, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 633.

FALL 20031

MONITORING WEBMAIL

the invasion of privacy test: whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists nor whether the monitoring would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person," 7 have been addressed directly
by the courts. At this point, only inferences can be drawn from the
court's reasoning in denying the common law claims in the
company, proprietary e-mail monitoring cases. Once the themes
and logic are identified, they can be applied to these new
monitoring situations. Similarities exist between the two e-mail
monitoring situations. Webmail access exists at work only through
the use of company computers and the company's Internet
connection. Furthermore, companies may have a policy of
monitoring all Internet activity, which would include webmail
accounts. Finally, the e-mail is open to future access by other
parties if recipients forward the message. Company e-mail
accounts share these same features, and, relying on these
characteristics, the courts have held that a reasonable expectation
of privacy did not exist.
In evaluating the second prong, "offensiveness to a
reasonable person," inferences also must be drawn from the
company e-mail monitoring cases. Just as in company e-mail
monitoring, businesses still have legitimate interests to protect and
presumably employees will be put on notice of possible monitoring
if a policy of monitoring exists. At each point, employees make a
calculated choice to have their e-mail monitored by choosing to
use the employer's Internet to log on to their personal account and
then again when sending and receiving personal e-mail messages
at work. These have been important factors for the court to find
that a reasonable person would not find the monitoring highly
offensive. Because both types of monitoring share these features,
the courts should hold the same for monitoring of web-based, email accounts. Therefore, due to the similarity of the
characteristics the court views as important, if employers follow
the same procedures as they do when monitoring company,
proprietary e-mail, a valid claim for invasion of privacy should not
exist when monitoring personal webmail so long as it has been
accessed from the company's computer and Internet access.
117
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Suggestions for Monitoring Policies

As companies react to a shift by employees from using
company, proprietary e-mail accounts to personal, web-based ones,
many employers will begin to monitor this type of e-mail use at
work. Given the lack of case history regarding such monitoring,
employers should act proactively to avoid lawsuits or develop
strong defenses to combat such attacks. Several commentators
have discussed strategies employers can use to implement effective
monitoring policies. "1 8 While these may be helpful as "best
practices," the current environment of personal, web-based e-mail
monitoring is still relatively young and has not been extensively
challenged in the courts. Given this lack of judicial history and the
potential for increased employee resistance, the policies employers
adopt will need to be more proactive and seek a better balance
between employers' interests of security and employee sense of
autonomy and privacy." 9 The following recommendations will
help a company's e-mail policy establish such balance by
incorporating traditional consent policy formation with creative,
flexible solutions.
A. Barriers to Access: Policy Creation and Notification
1. Consent Policy
Employers need to have written e-mail monitoring policies
that require employees to consent to potential monitoring of their
e-mail use as a condition of employment. The policy and consent
form should then be stored in employees' personnel files. In order
for the consent to be effective, the monitoring policy must be
explicit in its wording. This is especially important if e-mail use is
118See,

e.g., McEwan, supra note 10, at 23-24; Echols, supra note 11, at 298.
119 Enbysk, supra note 7 (quoting Michael Gartenberg, research director at
Jupiter Media Metrix, "[e]mployees need to understand that it is the employer's
right to protect its business communications vehicles from abuse .... " At the
same time, "[e]mployers need to understand that expectations need to be set and
met, and that an appropriate balance needs to be achieved between total trust of
employees and total lack of trust.").
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already in existence at the time the policy is adopted. 120 The
policy should note that there is no expectation of privacy in the use
of such e-mail and that e-mail from the company system is
company property.121 Some employees may feel micromanaged
by this policy so companies may wish to note that monitoring is a
right reserved by the employer. Additionally, companies could
emphasize to employees that they can use e-mail at their discretion
for emergency or critical purposes, however, that use could be
subject to monitoring.
To ensure that the company's policy is visible, employers
may opt to have an on-screen pop-up box that is triggered any time
the employee opens the web-browsing or e-mail software.
Employees could remove the box only by signaling their
agreement with the following statement: "I understand and
comply with [COMPANY NAME]'s policy on the monitoring of
and restrictions on e-mail use." This keeps employees on notice of
company monitoring and requires them to make a conscious choice
to accept such monitoring at each use. 122 Another suggestion
employers may consider is displaying the policy in such a manner
that upon initial login, the employee is presented with the policy
prior
to network
access.by23theByemployer.
logging in, employees signal their
consent
to monitoring
2. Specify Web-based Personal E-mail
To make the policy more clear, companies should
specifically call out and highlight the fact that the company's
policy will apply to personal, web-based e-mail access, in addition
to company e-mail. Making certain that employees know this email is also open to monitoring will cause them to seriously
consider what types of e-mail to send and receive from work.
Companies should also explain that when personal e-mail is
retrieved or sent via the company's server or Internet connection,
there is a possibility that these e-mails may be copied onto the
120

White, supra note 36, at 1103.

121 Id.

122

Komando, supra note 113.
Echols, supranote 11, at 300.
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computer's hard drive or company server, stored, and may be
accessed by the employer at a later date.
Certain aspects of the policy should be specifically directed
at the use of web-based, personal e-mail. For instance, employees
should be restricted in their ability to download attachments
received in their personal e-mail accounts. Employees should also
be restricted from sending or receiving any business or companyrelated e-mail from their personal address. This ensures that
clients and co-workers only communicate with the employee via
the company-sanctioned proprietary account. To allow otherwise
may create a decreased level of professionalism between
employee, as a representative of the company, and client.
3. Selectively Block Access to Internet Sites
Depending on the size and needs of the company, some
employers may choose to block the entire Internet system in
certain circumstances. While this is extreme and often impossible
for most companies, they should consider restricting access to
certain sites they deem inappropriate for use at work, such as
pornographic websites, Internet auctions, job search sites, webbased personal e-mail sites, and sports sites. Being overly
restrictive sometimes affects employee morale or attitude.' 24
Therefore, employers must be careful to balance the legitimate
need to restrict this access with the employees' right to autonomy.
Selectively blocking certain websites has two benefits. First, if
webmail Internet sites, such as Yahoo.com, are blocked, then
employees are never able to access their personal, web-based
accounts at work and the need for monitoring of this e-mail type
will not exist. Second, selective blocking allows employers to
choose what Internet sites would be inappropriate, while at the
same type maintaining access to sites that are used for legitimate
company purposes, such as research and sales.
124

Sindy J. Policy, Employer Monitoringof Employee Internet and Email Use:

An Effective LitigationAvoidance Tool, COMPUTER & INTERNET L., Nov. 2000,

at 21; Conlin, supra note 3 (stating that employees may question their

commitment to a company that is sending the message to its workers that it does
not trust them); Enbysk, supra note 7.
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Despite these benefits, there is a possible complication that
arises from selective e-mail monitoring. Besides being overbroad
in some cases, employers will never be able to effectively block
access to all Internet sites that provide webmail access. The
proliferation of web-based e-mail accounts makes it almost
impossible to block access to all of these sites. Many companies,
education institutions, and organizations offer web-based e-mail
accounts. Individually blocking access to each and every one of
the possible web-based account sites appears impossible.
However, in the right situation, for some companies, this will be
the best policy and may be the most cost effective method of
decreasing the greatest percentage of web-based e-mail access.
B. Alternative Employee Access
Employees may wish to utilize their own wireless laptop
computers, Internet-enabled cell phones, and other non-company
Internet connections to send and receive personal e-mail during
work. 125 This allows employees to keep their personal messages
private. The use of non-company technology still presents the
employer with the problem of decreased workplace productivity,
so employers may wish to suggest these options only in emergency
situations. Additionally, employers may instruct employees using
these technologies to conduct personal business during "time off,"
such as lunchtime or during breaks. This allows the employee to
maintain connection during the day via e-mail, while avoiding the
employers' concerns of liability and decreased productivity. This
is a win-win situation for both parties.
C. Remedial Solutions
1. Penalties for Violation
Detailing the penalties for violations of the policy may help
employees take the policy more seriously. 126 If employees know
what the consequences are for breaking company rules, they may
125Echols, supra note 11, at 299.
126 White, supra note 36, at 1103.
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be more likely to comply. Not only defining the violations, but
also avoiding acquiescence of violations is important. If
employees view the policy as dormant, they may ignore it. Finally,
companies should closely document all violations, responses, and
follow-ups and place that information in the employees' personnel
files. This will prevent an employee pleading ignorance to the
presence of a monitoring policy to which they consented.
2. Requiring Employee Indemnification for
Damage
In certain high-risk situations, such as when the nature of
the employment involves sensitive company material, companies
may need to take drastic action to ensure personal e-mail use does
not affect them adversely. While this approach should be limited
in application, some situations may dictate that employers require
employees to indemnify companies in the event of any loss that
arises from their use of company resources for personal e-mail. As
noted, the psychological impact of this type of policy could be
damaging to employee relations, so it should be reserved for
situations where e-mail has high potential for disastrous effects on
the company.
D. Employee Response
When suggesting how employees should act in this new era
of monitoring, perhaps one professional summed it up best, "A
word to the wise: Treat your e-mail system at work as you should
your business phone. Strictly limit your communications with
family and friends. And do not send a message if you would be
127
uncomfortable having a co-worker or your employer read it.
Furthermore, "[n]ever send an e-mail.., at work that you
wouldn't be afraid to read the next day on the front page of a

127

Barbara Kate Repa, Computers and Email on the Job, at

http://www.hrlawinfo.com/lawguide/Privacy/computersandemai.asp (last
visited Oct. 24, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
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newspaper....128 The best advice is to use common sense.
Avoid using web-based e-mail accounts while at work and only
make exceptions for employer-approved emergencies.
V.

Conclusion

Now that employees are beginning to shift to using
personal, web-based accounts while at work, employers are
beginning to expand their monitoring practices. Relying on the
limited case history that exists, coupled with the better-defined
analysis of proprietary e-mail accounts, companies have support
for monitoring and should be able to withstand employee lawsuits
challenging such practices.
By avoiding the interception of e-mails in transmission,
employers avoid vulnerability from the ECSA. Choosing a
program that only monitors e-mails that are physically viewed by
the employee while at work on the company computer will likely
avoid the SCA's restrictions on accessing stored communications.
Following the suggestions of this article in drafting a policy and
consent form will allow a company to have a safety net against
such statutory liability. It appears that given the similarity in the
methods of monitoring, and the reasoning behind monitoring, in
both proprietary and personal e-mail accounts, employers can
defeat invasion of privacy claims. Close examination of the
rationale and dicta of the court can flesh out hints about the
direction the court may take for invasion of privacy cases that are
sure to come. Since both types of monitoring share similar
characteristics and logic, it stands that if employers go about the
monitoring in the manner described in this article, employers will
stand a good chance of withstanding an invasion of privacy claim.
As technology becomes more and more sophisticated,
employers expect greater demands from their employees;
employees feel pressures to better balance their work and life
responsibilities; and societal pressures cause companies to seek
safety and increased productivity. As such, it is inevitable that
situations such as the ones addressed in this article will continue to
128
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proliferate. For these reasons it is imperative that employers,
employees, and all other stakeholders search for the common
ground and formulate proactive solutions.
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